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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five states have addressed whether a duty exists in take-home asbestos 
exposure cases. The majority, 16 ofthe 25, conclude a duty does not exist, especially 
where the asbestos exposure ended prior to the 1972 OSHA Regulations. 1 Applying the 
factors set forth in B.R. ex ref. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, 275 P.3d 228, the Court should 
join the majority and hold that Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC ("KUC") did not owe a duty 
to Barbara Boynton ("Mrs. Boynton") for take-home asbestos exposure. 
Affirmative acts must be wrongful in order to create a duty. Appellee Larry 
Boynton ("Mr. Boynton") argues that KUC's scraping, sawing, sweeping, installing, and 
mixing of asbestos creates a duty between KUC and Mrs. Boynton. (Op. Br. at 22-23.) 
To be sure, that conduct involves affirmative acts, but there are no allegations or evidence 
that such conduct was wrongful. Moreover, that conduct is not even directed at Mrs. 
Boynton, who never stepped foot on KUC's premises. Instead, it was Mr. Boynton, who 
has never developed any asbestos-related disease, who was allegedly exposed to asbestos 
because ofKUC's affirmative conduct. Mr. Boynton's claim is entirely based on KUC's 
alleged omissions-primarily the failure to prevent him from exposing Mrs. Boynton to 
asbestos. KUC's alleged failures do not create a duty to Mrs. Boynton, absent a special 
relationship, which here there undisputedly is not. 
Regardless of KUC' s alleged affirmative conduct, foreseeability eliminates any 
duty between KUC and Mrs. Boynton. KUC was an end user of asbestos-containing 
1 http://www .maronmarvel.com/news-insights/ duty-for-take-home-asbestos-exposures-a-
jurisdictional-analysis. 
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materials-it did not manufacture, tnine, or produce asbestos. In fact, Mr. Boynton 
alleges that the asbestos manufacturing defendants should have warned KUC of the 
dangers of asbestos. (R. 1238-50.) The harm from take-home asbestos exposure was not 
reasonably foreseeable to premises owners like KUC prior to the 1972 OSHA 
Regulations, which imposed specific requirements on etnployers to prevent take-home 
asbestos exposure. Mr. Boynton stopped working at KUC's premises in 1966, several 
years before the OSHA Regulations, and KUC has cited many cases holding that no duty 
exists in take-hotne cases where the exposure, like here, ended before those regulations. 
Mr. Boynton's evidence is insufficient to show that harm from take-home asbestos 
exposure was reasonably foreseeable from 1961 to 1966 to premises owners like KUC. 
He relies almost exclusively on Dr. Lemen, but Dr. Lemen does not even opine that the 
harm from take-home asbestos exposure was reasonably foreseeable during that 
timeframe. And the materials Dr. Lemen relies upon are not specific to take-home 
asbestos exposure or are not even related to asbestos. 
Any duty is also eliminated because Mr. Boynton, not KUC, was better situated to 
prevent Mrs. Boynton from being exposed to asbestos. As stated in KUC's initial brief, 
neither KUC nor Mr. Boynton was well-positioned to prevent the harm because of the 
lack of foreseeability. However, the relevant question is which party was better situated 
to prevent the harm from occurring. Mr. Boynton is the one who exposed Mrs. Boynton 
to asbestos, not KUC. Mr. Boynton could have shaken out his clothing or otherwise 
decreased the amount of asbestos dust he tracked into the hotne. 
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Finally, public policy eliminates any duty between KUC and Mrs. Boynton. 
Creating a duty in take-home cases results in a virtually limitless pool of potential 
plaintiffs and exposes KUC to limitless liability. Mr. Boynton tries to draw the duty line 
around household family members by relying on foreseeability, but this line is not so 
easy to draw. There are many situations where it would be more foreseeable that a non-
household family member would be exposed to asbestos-covered clothing than a 
household family member. 
The district court granted PacifiCorp and Conoco's motions for summary 
judgment after thoroughly analyzing the foregoing Jeff factors, which analysis included 
the following: 
Affinnative acts. "The injury and damages complained of - the harm to 
Mrs. Boynton - are linked to Defendants' omissions, rather than any 
alleged affirmative acts." 
Foreseeability. "As a result, it would be a vast expansion of Utah Tort Law 
to find that, based on the relationships of the parties; and etnployer could 
foresee harm to the spouse of an employee of an independent contractor." 
Which party is best situated to prevent the harm. "This factor also weighs 
against itnposing a duty because protecting every person with whom a 
business' employees and the employees of its independent contractors 
come into contact, or even with whom their clothes come into contact, 
would itnpose an extraordinarily onerous and unworkable burden." 
Public .QOlicy: "The pressure this expansion of the common law would put 
on the titne and resources of courts, society, and businesses in general 
weighs against finding a company owes a duty to persons with whom the 
employees of its independent contractors come in contact." 
(R. 5444-46.) 
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Instead of analyzing these factors with respect to KUC's motion, the district court 
drew a distinction between an employee and an independent contractor, without 
explanation, and found "a disputed issue of material fact as to whether a legal duty 
extends to Mrs. Boynton." (R. 5447.)2 But there is no disputed issue of material fact, 
and the district court's analysis of the Jeffs factors should apply equally to KUC. 
The issue before the court is purely a legal question-does a duty exist in take-
home exposure cases where the exposure ended before 1972. The Court should answer 
that question negatively and reverse the district court's denial ofKUC's motion for 
summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
KUC did not engage in wrongful affirmative conduct that harmed Mrs. Boynton. 
Regardless, the minus factors of foreseeability, which party is best situated to prevent the 
harm, and public policy eliminate any duty between KUC and Mrs. Boynton. 
I. KUC OWES NO DUTY TO MRS. BOYNTON ON THE BASIS OF 
WRONGFUL AFFIRMATIVE CONDUCT. 
Affirmative acts must be wrongful in order to create a duty. Jeffs, 20 12 UT 11, ~ 
7. KUC owes no duty to Mrs. Boynton because there are no allegations or evidence that 
KUC engaged in wrongful affirmative conduct; instead, Mr. Boynton's claim against 
KUC is based entirely on omissions. 
2 Mr. Boynton claims, without citation, that "[t]he district court correctly ruled that 




A. There are no allegations or evidence KUC's affirmative acts were 
wrongful. 
Mr. Boynton does not allege that KUC engaged in wrongful affirmative conduct. 
Nevertheless, he insists "[h]is complaint repeatedly asserted that his injuries were caused 
by [KUC's] negligent use of asbestos." (Op. Br. at 11.) He relies on language from the 
complaint's background section that KUC scraped, sawed, swept, installed, and mixed 
asbestos. (Op. Br. at 22-23.) But the complaint does not allege that this conduct was 
negligent or otherwise wrongful, and he identifies no other affirmative conduct by KUC. 
(R. 1237, 1250-54.) 
Recognizing that he did not allege KUC's affirmative acts were wrongful, Mr. 
Boynton references Utah's notice-pleading standard and argues that "Kennecott 
undertook its affirmative conduct negligently" because his "cause of action was for 
negligence." (Op. Br. at 26.) But his negligence cause of action does not mention, 
reference, or even incorporate the allegations of scraping, sawing, sweeping, installing, 
and mixing. (R. 1250-54.) And again, there are no allegations anywhere in the 
complaint that KUC performed that conduct negligently. Like the plaintiff in Hill v. 
Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., Mr. Boynton fails "to connect up any activity that 
[KUC] voluntarily undertook with an allegation of negligence in the performance of that 
activity." 2013 UT 60, ~ 39, 321 P.3d 1054 (emphasis in original). 3 
3 When introducing Hill in its initial brief, KUC states that Hill "further illustrates that 
KUC's alleged tortious conduct consists only of misfeasance." (Br. at 13.) This 




There also is no evidence that KUC's scraping, sawing, sweeping, installing, and 
mixing of asbestos was negligent. Mr. Boynton has not cited any expert testimony 
explaining how KUC was negligent in those activities or what KUC should have done 
differently with respect to those activities. 
B. Mr. Boynton's claim against KUC is based entirely on omissions. 
Mr. Boynton's claim against KUC, as outlined in his complaint, is based entirely 
on nonfeasance. (R. 1250-54.) His claim is that Mrs. Boynton's "injury could have been 
prevented if [KUC] had chosen to undertake additional activities" to prevent Mr. 
Boynton from carrying asbestos home on his clothing. Hill, 2013 UT 60, ~ 41 (emphasis 
in original). As explained by the district court, "[t]he allegations themselves begin with 
the word 'failure' in each of the charging allegations in paragraph 55 of the Amended 
Complaint" and therefore "[t]he injury and damages complained of- the harm to Mrs. 
Boynton - are linked only to Defendants' omissions, rather than any alleged affirmative 
acts." (R. 5444.) Paragraph 55 of the complaint is brought against KUC, Conoco, and 
PacifiCorp-not just Conoco and PacifiCorp. (!d. at 1250-51.) Like Graves v. N.E. 
Servs., Inc. , Mr. Boynton's "core complaint is with [the three defendants'] omissions or 
failures," not their affirmative conduct. 2015 UT 28, ~ 27, 345 P.3d 619. 
Graves is squarely on point. It explains that a defendant's "affirmative acts are a 
basis for itnposing a duty in the performance of those acts, not a broader duty to 
undertake additional n1easures aimed at preventing [hann] by a third party." 2015 UT 28, 
~ 29 (emphasis in original). Mr. Boynton argues that Graves is distinguishable because 
KUC created the danger in the first place. (Op. Br. at 27.) But KUC did not expose Mrs. 
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Boynton, who never stepped foot on its premises, to asbestos-Mr. Boynton did so by 
bringing asbestos home on his clothing. This is "an act of a third party that [KUC] failed 
to prevent," Graves, 2015 UT 28, ~ 20, and is the crux ofMr. Boynton's negligence 
claim, not KUC's use of asbestos. 
II. FORESEEABILITY ELIMINATES ANY DUTY BETWEEN KUC AND 
MRS. BOYNTON. 
Regardless of any wrongful affirmative act, foreseeability eliminates any duty 
between KUC and Mrs. Boynton because harm from take-hotne exposure was not 
reasonably foreseeable frotn 1961-66 and there was no relationship between KUC and 
Mrs. Boynton. 
A. Harm from take-home asbestos exposure was not reasonably 
foreseeable prior to the 1972 OSHA Regulations. 
Mr. Boynton defines the category of cases as "premises owners who expose those 
on their property to a known toxin, asbestos, which in turn causes injuries to individuals 
off the premises." (Op. Br. at 31.) While "foreseeability in duty analysis is evaluated at 
a broad, categorical level," Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ~ 25, Mr. Boynton's defined class is too 
broad because it does not account for a time period. Whether harm from take-home 
asbestos exposure is foreseeable in the internet age is a different question than whether it 
was foreseeable from 1961 to 1966. It is critical not to inject hindsight bias into the 
determination of foreseeability. Moreover, the issue is when the harm from take-home 
asbestos exposure was reasonably foreseeable, not when the harm from substantial, 
prolonged occupational asbestos exposure was reasonably foreseeable. The category of 
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cases is therefore better defined as take-home asbestos exposure claims against premises 
owners where the exposure ended prior to 1972. 
1. There is insufficient evidence that harm from take-home asbestos 
exposure was reasonably foreseeable from 1961 to 1966. 
As explained by the Texas Court of Appeals in Alcoa Inc. v. Behringer, the 
foreseeability of substantial, prolonged occupational asbestos exposure is not the same as 
take-home asbestos exposure: 
In this case, the record reflects that the general danger of prolonged 
occupational asbestos exposure to asbestos-manufacturing workers was 
known at least by the tnid-1930s. But in this case, the issue is not when it 
was generally known that substantial, prolonged exposure to asbestos in the 
workplace was dangerous to asbestos workers. Instead, the pivotal issue 
here is when it became generally known that non-occupational [or take-
home] exposure to asbestos could be dangerous. 
235 S.W.3d 456, 461-62 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (finding "the danger of non-occupational 
exposure to asbestos dust on workers' clothes was neither known nor reasonably 
foreseeable to Alcoa in the 1950s") (emphasis added). Like Behringer, Mr. Boynton's 
cited evidence does not support the claim that harm from take-home asbestos exposure 
was reasonably foreseeable from 1961 to 1966. 
Instead, Mr. Boynton equates evidence that harm from inhaling large quantities of 
asbestos dust by workers in asbestos mines, mills, and factories was foreseeable as 
evidence that hann from take-hotne asbestos exposure was foreseeable. (Op. Br. at 13-
17, 31-33.) Mr. Boynton cites Dr. Lemen's affidavit, warnings from trade organizations, 
and warnings frotn industrial hygienists as evidence that harm from take-hotne asbestos 
exposure was foreseeable from 1961 to 1966. (!d.) KUC addressed the insufficiency of 
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Mr. Boynton's evidence at the district court. For example, in response to Fact No. 21 of 
Plaintiffs Counter-Statement of Undisputed Facts, KUC's reply in support of its motion 
for summary judgtnent states: 
The Lemen Affidavit refers to the general risks of asbestos and fails to 
show that KUC knew or should have known about the risk of mesothelioma 
from take-home asbestos exposure during the time Mr. Boynton worked at 
the premises. The Lemen Affidavit also identifies the 1972 OSHA 
regulations, which were not in effect at the thne Mr. Boynton worked at 
KUC's premises. There is simply no evidence that KUC knew or should 
have known of the potential harm from take-home asbestos exposure during 
the relevant pre-OSHA time period. 
(R. 5012.) A close examination of the citations to the medical and scientific literature 
relied on by Dr. Lemen and a close reading of the articles reveal that the early case 
reports prior to 1966 did not establish whether or not there was an association between 
domestic exposure to asbestos and mesothelioma or the magnitude of that association. At 
best, the literature and articles support the general proposition that hann frotn exposure to 
large quantities of asbestos dust by traditional high risk trades such as asbestos miners 
and asbestos factory workers was foreseeable, not that harm from take-home exposure 
was foreseeable. 
1. Dr. Lemen's affidavit 
Dr. Letnen does not specifically opine that harm from take-home asbestos 
exposure was reasonably foreseeable from 1961 to 1966. (R. 2974-88.) Mr. Boynton 
includes the following quotations from Dr. Lemen's affidavit, neither of which 
specifically addresses take-home asbestos exposure: 
• "By 1964 there were more than 700 articles in the worldwide medical literature 
highlighting the health effects associated with asbestos exposure and its toxic 
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nature. By 1964, all the major asbestos-related diseases, including asbestosis, lung 
cancer and mesothelioma, had been causally established through epidemiology 
and reported in the scientific literature." (Op. Br. at 14, 32.) 
• "[T]he health hazards of asbestos, including mesothelioma, were well established 
and widely known and accepted prior to [Mr. Boynton's] employment as a laborer 
and then as an electrician." (ld. at 14, 32-33.) 
These statements concern the health hazards of direct occupational asbestos exposure to 
workers who inhaled high concentrations of asbestos dust and demonstrate how Mr. 
Boynton conflates what was generally known by 1964 about the health hazards 
associated with asbestos exposure by those in high-risk occupational trades, such as 
asbestos workers and insulators, with what was known about the foreseeable risk of harm 
posed by take-home asbestos exposure resulting from indirect and intermittent bystander 
exposure of workers at a non-asbestos manufacturing facility. 
Mr. Boynton also argues that "Dr. Lemen explained that the dangers of take-home 
exposure-for all kinds of toxic substances-have been known since the early twentieth 
century" and that "the dangers of laundering contaminated clothing have been known for 
centuries." (Op. Br. at 14, 33.) These general opinions are not specific to asbestos, do 
not distinguish between toxic substances, and do not specify the dosage or degree of 
exposure necessary to result in harm. Whether harm is foreseeable from laundering 
clothing caked in lead or drenched in arsenic is not the same question as whether harm is 
foreseeable from laundering the clothing of a worker occasionally and indirectly exposed 
to asbestos dust. 
The treatise Epidemiology of Abestos-Related Diseases, authored by Dr. Lemen, 
demonstrates that the first speculation of the possibility that asbestos-related disease 
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might result from take-home exposure was raised by Newhouse & Thompson in the 
British Journal of Industrial Medicine in 1965. (R. 3109, 3165. )4 The population 
observed by Newhouse had significant community environmental exposure from a 
crocidolite asbestos factory in the neighborhood and to a lesser extent included persons 
with a history of living with an asbestos workers. (R. 2979-81, 3109, 3165.) There is no 
evidence that these early case reports were widely disseminated or well known. Dr. 
Lemen's own citations to the scientific literature in his treatise demonstrate that it was not 
until 197 6 that an epidemiological exposure study of household contact with asbestos was 
first published. (R. 3109, 3183.) 
Early case reports merely suggesting a connection between non-occupational 
exposure by persons living in close proximity to asbestos 1nines and the development of 
asbestos-related diseases does not establish that harm from take-home exposure was 
reasonably foreseeable to a non-asbestos manufacturing premises owner during the time 
period that Mr. Boynton worked at KUC. 
u. Warnings from trade organizations 
Mr. Boynton states that "by the 1960s, trade organizations were circulating articles 
and other warnings about the dangers of asbestos." (Op. Br. at 31.) Mr. Boynton 
specifically identifies a 1962 Industrial Hygiene Journal ("identifl:Ying] measures to 
attempt to minimize asbestos exposures" to insulation workers in shipyards), a 1964 
AIHA publication (recognizing "exposures to asbestos-containing pipe-covering and 
thermal insulation" is dangerous), and a National Safety Council publication ("warning of 
4 The Newhouse study is also addressed at page 17 ofKUC's brief. 
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the toxicity of asbestos"). (!d. at 16, 31-32.) Again, none of these publications are 
specific to take-home asbestos exposure. 
Mr. Boynton then cites a 1960 Industrial Hygiene Foundation abstract showing 
"asbestos contamination as far as 600 meters from the work site" and a 1963 publication 
of autopsies involving community exposures. (Op. Br. at 31-32.) Community exposure, 
often influenced by factors such as wind and proximity to the asbestos source, is not the 
same as take-home exposure. An article showing asbestos contamination 600 meters-
less than a half mile-from an asbestos mine does not mean take-home exposure from a 
worker such as Mr. Boynton was foreseeable 
111. Warnings from industrial hygienists 
Finally, Mr. Boynton states that Conoco's industrial hygienist "testified that he 
first learned of the hazards of asbestos in 1939" and that he was "in charge of collecting 
information on the health hazards of asbestos insulating material and reporting that 
information to the American Petroleum Institute." (Op. Br. at 17.) Again, this evidence 
is not specific to take-home exposure. 
2. KUC cites evidence that harm from take-home asbestos exposure 
was not reasonably foreseeable from 1961 to 1966. 
Despite relying on evidence that was not specific to take-home asbestos exposure 
or not even specific to asbestos, Mr. Boynton repeatedly claims that KUC failed to cite 
any evidence that harm frotn take-home asbestos exposure was not foreseeable. (Op. Br. 
at 13, 31, 33.) That is incorrect. KUC relies on two critical pieces of evidence in arguing 




and (2) Mr. Boynton stopped working at KUC's premises long before those regulations 
were promulgated. (R. 5008, 5012, 5014-16.) Despite criticizing KUC for not citing any 
evidence on the issue, Mr. Boynton cites the very 1972 OSHA Regulations as evidence 
that harm from take-home asbestos exposure was foreseeable to PacifiCorp and Conoco. 
(Op. Br. at 17.) Under Mr. Boynton's contradictory logic, the regulations can be 
evidence that harm was foreseeable but cannot be evidence that the harm was not 
foreseeable. And interestingly, the regulations are the only evidence cited by Mr. 
Boynton that specifically addresses take-home exposure. (Op. Br. at 17 ("The 1972 
regulations dealt specifically with the dangers of asbestos dust traveling on clothing into 
homes."). In short, the OSHA Regulations provide the Court a categorical basis to draw 
the line on foreseeability. 
3. The majority of cases, especially where the exposure ended before 
1972, hold that no duty exists. 
Where the take-home asbestos exposure ends before 1972, courts routinely hold 
that no duty exists. See Behringer, 235 S.W.3d at 458, 462 (last exposure was 1959); 
Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1995 WL 17778064, at* 1, 4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 
1995) (last exposure was 1960); Martin v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2007 WL 2682064, at* 1, 5 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2007), aff'd, Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445-
46 (6th Cir. 2009) (last exposure was 1963 ); In re Certified Question from Fourteenth 
Dist. Court of Appeals of Texas, 740 N.W.2d 206, 218 (Mich. 2007) (last exposure was 
1965); Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 965 F.2d 844, 847 (lOth Cir. 





(Md. Ct. App. 2013) (last exposure was 1969). As these courts have noted, prior to the 
OSHA regulations, non-asbestos manufacturing companies simply did not have the 
expertise to evaluate first reports in science and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. 
Mr. Boynton attempts to distinguish Martin and Fourteenth Dist. because those courts 
concluded take-home exposure was not foreseeable pre-OSHA "based on the insufficient 
evidence that the plaintiffs presented to thetn." (Op. Br. at 34.) That is the same 
conclusion KUC asks the Court to reach here-there is insufficient evidence that hann 
from take-hotne exposure was reasonably foreseeable before 1972. 
Cases where the asbestos exposure occurred post-OSHA are not persuasive in this 
case because the regulations changed the foreseeability of harm from take-home asbestos 
exposure and Mr. Boynton stopped working at KUC's premises long before 1972. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Boynton cites three take-home exposure cases in support of his 
foreseeability argutnent-all of which involve post-OSHA exposure periods: Zimko v. 
Am. Cyanamid, 905 So.2d 465 (La. App. Ct. 2005) (exposure occurring from 1945-66 
and 1977-2001);5 Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1146 (N.J. 2006) 
(exposure occurring from 194 7 to 1984 ); and Ramsey v. Georgia Southern University 
Advanced Development Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1263 (Del. 2018) (exposure occurring from 
1967 to 1979). In fact, Ramsey states that the "precise risk of harm" (take-home 
exposure) was recognized by the 1972 OSHA Regulations. I d. at 1280. Moreover, 
5 A later Louisiana court cautioned against relying on Zimko because the decision was 
never reviewed by the supreme court. See Thomas v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 933 So. 2d 
843, 871 (La. App. 2006) ("Any person citing Zimko in the future should be wary of the 
problems of the majority's opinion in Zimko in view of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
never being requested to review the correctness of the liability of American Cyanamid.") 
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Zimko relied exclusively on a New York intennediate appellate court decision that was 
subsequently reversed. 905 So.2d at 483.6 And none of the cases persuasively explain 
how the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of take-home exposure during 
the relevant timeframe. 7 
4. The district court did not accept Mr. Boynton's foreseeability 
evidence. 
Mr. Boynton incorrectly claims, without citation, that "[t]he district court correctly 
accepted Mr. Boynton's uncontroverted evidence that Mrs. Boynton's injury was 
foreseeable." (Op. Br. at 33.) As to Conoco and PacifiCorp, the court rejected Mr. 
Boynton's foreseeability evidence and determined "it would be a vast expansion of Utah 
Tort Law to find that, based on the relationships of the parties; an employer could foresee 
harm to the spouse of an etnployee of an independent contractor." (R. 5445.) The 
district court did not address foreseeability as to KUC, but KUC agrees that "it would be 
a vast expansion of Utah Tort Law" to impose a duty on KUC for take-hotne asbestos 
exposure. 
6 Fourteenth Dist., 7 40 N. W.2d at 216 ("However, the Louisiana court relied exclusively 
on a New York intermediate appellate court decision that was subsequently reversed by 
New York's highest court .... Because the court in Zimko relied exclusively on a 
decision that has since been reversed, we do not find Zimko persuasive."); Martin, 2007 
WL 2682064 at *8 ("[T]he New York appellate court decision that the Zimko court found 
to be 'instructive' was overturned by the New York Court of Appeals after Zimko was 
decided."). 
7 Martin, 561 F.3d at 446 (explaining that though Olivo's and Zimko 's "analysis is rooted 
in foreseeability" the opinions fail to "persuasively explain[] how the defendant could 
have known the risk of secondary exposure involved."). 
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B. There is no relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton. 
As quoted in Mr. Boynton's brief, foreseeability relates to "the general 
relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the victim and the general foreseeability 
of the hann." (Op. Br. at 29-30 (quoting Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ~ 25).)8 While much of the 
briefing has concerned "the general foreseeability of' take-home asbestos exposure, the 
complete lack of a relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton is a critical 
consideration in evaluating foreseeability. Mrs. Boynton was never employed by KUC 
and never even stepped foot on KUC' s premises. Indeed, KUC and Mrs. Boynton are 
"legal strangers." Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2014) ("Mrs. 
Gillen's relationship with Defendant Boeing as it relates to her take-hotne exposure claitn 
is essentially that of 'legal strangers' under the law of negligence."). It is not reasonable 
to expect KUC to foresee harm cotning to those with whom it has no relationship. 
III. KUC DID NOT OWE MRS. BOYNTON A DUTY BECAUSE MR. 
BOYNTON WAS BETTER POSITIONED THAN KUC TO PREVENT 
HARM FROM COMING TO MRS. BOYNTON. 
The individual, not the premises owner, is better situated to prevent others frotn 
being exposed to asbestos carried on the individual ' s clothing. For example, Mr. 
Boynton could have shaken out his clothing before leaving work instead of walking into 
his home apparently covered in asbestos dust. Or he could have left his coveralls at his 
personal locker at KUC's premises. (R. 5240.) In fact, during his deposition he initially 
8 The second Jeffs factor also considers the relationship of the parties. Specifically, if 
there is a special relationship between the tortfeasor and the injured party then a duty may 
arise in nonfeasance cases. Mr. Boynton does not contend that this case involves a special 
relationship or that there is a relationship between Mr. Boynton and Mrs. Boynton. 
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said that he left his work clothes in his locker each day when he wrt home but then 
backtracked, as if catching himself, and said he only left his safety equipment in his 
locker. (!d.) 
In finding that Conoco and PacifiCorp were not best situated to prevent harm from 
coming to Mrs. Boynton, the district court stated: 
This factor also weighs against imposing a duty because "protecting every 
person with whom a business' etnployees and the employees of its 
independent contractors cotne into contact, or even with whom their clothes 
come into contact, would itnpose an extraordinarily onerous and 
unworkable burden." 
(R. 5446 (quoting Fourteenth Dist., 740 N.W.2d at 217.) The Michigan Supreme Court's 
reasoning, adopted by the district court, treats employees and independent contractors 
equally. As such, the district court should not have drawn the employee/independent 
contractor distinction. And the district court's analysis of this factor should likewise 
apply to KUC because it is "an extraordinarily onerous and unworkable burden" for KUC 
to protect every person with whotn Mr. Boynton's clothes tnight have come into contact 
with. 
In support of his argument that KUC was better situated than Mr. Boynton to 
prevent hann from coming to Mrs. Boynton, Mr. Boynton cites Satterfield v. Breeding 
Insulation Co. , 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008) and Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
855 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2017). Both cases involve exposure that occurred entirely post-
OSHA and are therefore tainted by the assumption that the harm was foreseeable. 
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353 (exposure occurring from 1979 to 1984); Bobo, 855 F.3d 
at 1298 (exposure occurring from 1975 to 1997). The Eleventh Circuit in Bobo 
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specifically concluded that the defendant "was in the best position to protect people like 
[the deceased] from take-hotne asbestos exposure by complying with the relevant 
regulations or internal policies that were designed for that purpose, but it failed to do so." 
855 F.3d at 1305 (noting the defendant "not only knew about the danger of take-home 
asbestos, it also knew about OSHA regulations that it was required to follow in order to 
limit exposure in the workplace and in the homes of its employees" and "knew of its own 
internal requirements that, if followed, would have limited exposure and prevented 
asbestos frotn being carried home on the its etnployees' clothes") (emphasis added). The 
Satterfield opinion likewise relies on the OSHA regulations in creating a duty. 266 
S.W.3d at 353 ("Contrary to the OSHA regulations, Alcoa failed to educate Mr. 
Satterfield and its other employees regarding the risk of asbestos or how to handle 
tnaterials containing asbestos."). In fact, Satterfield specifically states that "foreseeability 
concerns raised in [Behringer] d[id] not apply" because the "exposure could not have 
occurred prior to 1979." 266 S.W.3d at 372 n.65. Unlike the premises owners in Bobo 
and Satterfield, KUC did not know about the OSHA regulations because they did not 
exist and did not have any internal policies at the time related to take-home exposure. 
IV. KUC DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO MRS. BOYNTON BECAUSE PUBLIC 
POLICY WEIGHS AGAINST CREATING A DUTY IN TAKE-HOME 
ASBESTOS EXPOSURE CASES. 
Mr. Boynton attempts to limit the duty to household fatnily members, something 
he did not do in the district court. (Op. Br. at 42-44.) The reason why is clear-he 
recognizes that "without a litniting principle, liability for take-hotne exposure would 
essentially be infinite." Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 540. But foreseeability does not 
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provide a "principled basis" for creating a duty to household family tnembers because 
there are many scenarios where it would be tnore foreseeable for a non-family member to 
be exposed than a household family tnember. Consider a 17 -year-old son who is rarely 
home and who certainly does not do his father's laundry cotnpared to a nanny who is 
responsible for the family's laundry. Or consider that same 17-year-old son compared to 
an employee of a laundromat to whotn the family's laundry is taken on a weekly basis. It 
is clearly tnore foreseeable that the nanny and laundromat etnployee would be exposed 
than the son. See, e.g., id. ("Therefore, if Boeing owed Mrs. Gillen a duty, it would 
similarly be said to owe a duty to children, babysitters, neighbors, dry cleaners, or any 
other person who potentially came in contact with Mr. Gillen's clothes."). 
Mr. Boynton's argument mirrors the plaintiffs argument in In re NYC Asbestos 
Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005), which was rejected: 
Plaintiffs assure us that this will not lead to "limitless liability" because the 
new duty tnay be confined to members of the household of the employer's 
employee, or to metnbers of the household of those who come onto the 
landlord's pretnises. This line is not so easy to draw, however. For 
example, an etnployer would certainly owe the new duty to j an employee's 
spouse ( assutning the spouse lives with the etnployee ), but wrobably would 
not owe the duty to a babysitter who takes care of children in the 
employee's home five days a week. But the spouse tnay not have more 
exposure than the babysitter to whatever hazardous substances the 
employee may have introduced into the hotne from the workplace. 
Perhaps, for example, the babysitter (or maybe an employee of a 
neighborhood laundry) launders the family members' clothes. In short, as 
we pointed out in Hamilton, the 'specter of limitless liability' is banished 
only when 'the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed is 
circutnscribed by relationship. Here there is no relationship between the 
[employer] and [the etnployee's spouse]. 
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!d. at 122 (emphasis added). Here, the "line is not so easy to draw." !d. As a result, 
public policy weighs against creation of a duty in take-home exposure cases because 
liability would essentially be infinite. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 
(Ga. 2005) ("The recognition of a common-law cause of action under the circumstances 
of this case would, in our opinion, expand traditional tort concepts beyond manageable 
bounds and create an almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs."); Fourteenth Dist., 
740 N.W.2d at 219-21 (expressing concern that recognizing an etnployer's duty for take-
home asbestos would expose an employer to a "litnitless pool of plaintiffs" encotnpassing 
anyone who came into contact with an employee while he was wearing his work clothes). 
Mr. Boynton states that KUC is "tnistaken about the facts" because the nutnber of 
mesothelioma deaths in Utah and the percentage of hometnaker tnesotheliotna deaths in 
the United States are small. (Op. Br. at 42.) Mr. Boynton misunderstands KUC's 
argutnent. In arguing that creation of a duty in take-home exposure cases creates 
limitless liability, KUC does not argue there are a limitless nutnber of mesothelioma 
victims; instead, KUC, as supported by several cases, argues that there are a limitless 
nutnber of potential victitns-people who were potentially exposed to asbestos in non-
occupational settings. 
Mr. Boynton's citation to the number oftnesotheliotna victims is also misleading 
because a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases would not be limited only to 
mesothelioma victims. It is reported that asbestos exposure causes a number of diseases, 
and Mr. Boynton certainly is not arguing that a duty in take-home asbestos exposure 
cases would only be created if the victim contracted mesothelioma. 
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Creation of a duty violates public policy because it is unreasonable to expect KUC 
to prevent all of these potential victims from being exposed to asbestos dust. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that KUC did not owe a duty to 
Mrs. Boynton and should reverse the district court's denial ofKUC's Motion for 
Summary Judgtnent. 
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